Pulling hedonic utilitarianism out of ethical emotivism
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According to Bill Jackson writing on LessWrong, there's a persistent problem in moral philosophy: if moral statements are just expressions of emotion—'murder is bad' amounts to 'I disapprove of murder'—how do we explain moral reasoning? Quasi-realism tries to patch this by allowing emotional statements to connect logically, like 'if stealing is wrong, then borrowing without permission is also wrong.' But Jackson points out a deeper puzzle: what justifies moving from 'this feels true' to 'this IS true'? Even with logical rules we can grasp intuitively, we're left asking why we must accept them. It's the same gap Descartes grappled with in his demon thought experiment—a problem that still shadows moral philosophy today.
Source: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yKauDp6LgNpZ9L7iK/pulling...
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