The AI Race is Not a Prisoner's Dilemma

The dominant explanation for why artificial intelligence development feels like an unstoppable arms race goes like this: even though everyone would prefer that all players coordinate on safety and slow down, each side feels compelled to race ahead, fearing the others will pull ahead. That structure resembles what game theorists call a Prisoner's Dilemma. But LessWrong contributor Vaughn Papenhausen argues the analogy is flawed. Under plausible assumptions about the payoffs, he contends, the AI race is actually structured more like a Stag Hunt—a game where both players prefer mutual cooperation *if* they can trust the other to cooperate, but will default to safer, lower-reward options if they cannot be assured of that trust. If Papenhausen is right, the problem isn't that cooperation is impossible, but that credible assurance is missing.

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