Cluelessness: Summary of the argument, why it matters, and counterarguments

A new essay on LessWrong examines the 'cluelessness' argument at the heart of Effective Altruism, or EA. Author Anthony DiGiovanni breaks down a philosophical puzzle: if we can't predict the far-reaching consequences of our actions, how can we justify choosing one course of action over another on purely moral grounds? The argument rests on three key premises. First, that moral preferences need expected value comparisons to be justified. Second, that our understanding of consequences is too imprecise to make those comparisons. And third, that this imprecision is inherent to any action we might take. DiGiovanni emphasizes the argument doesn't mean nothing matters—other values and virtues still guide us. But it does suggest that actions justified purely by impartial altruism and cosmic-scale impact are on shakier philosophical ground than they might seem. The post also serves as a primer for an EA Forum competition inviting critiques, which closes on August fourteenth.

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